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Abstract
In recent years, dominant social media platforms like Facebook and Twitter have been
increasingly perceived as engaging in discrimination against conservative and right-wing
viewpoints – especially by conservatives themselves. Such concerns were exacerbated by
Twitter and Facebook’s deplatforming of then-President Trump in response to the president’s
tweets and posts leading up to and during the January 6th insurrection. Trump’s deplatforming,
coupled with the recent actions taken by the platforms in removing Covid- and election-related
misinformation, led to cries of censorship by conservative and increased calls for regulation of
the platforms. Supreme Court Justice Thomas took up this charge (in an opinion relating to a
different controversy involving Trump’s Twitter practices) and suggested a regulatory path
forward for lawmakers seeking to hold the platforms liable for alleged viewpoint discrimination
against and censorship of conservative voices. Justice Thomas’s suggested playbook for
regulation was adopted by several state and federal lawmakers, who have proposed a host of
legislative measures designed to address these concerns.
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In this Article, I examine the desirability and constitutionality of recent federal and state
legislative initiatives that seek to provide remedies for these alleged ills—including the proposed
federal DISCOURSE Act, the 21st Century FREE Speech Act, the PRO-SPEECH Act, and the
PACT Act, as well as state laws like those enacted in Florida and Texas and introduced in every
state in the country that seek to rein in the dominant platforms’ discretion exercised in content
moderation decisions to prohibit them from engaging in viewpoint discrimination (whether
human moderated or algorithmically implemented), and to impose notice, transparency and other
due process-type obligations on these platforms. This Article analyzes the key elements of such
proposed legislation in light of the obligations that the U.S. government historically has imposed
on common carriers and broadcasters. This Article then examines the procedural dimensions of
our free speech commitments and values and our commitments to due process, including those
enshrined in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (which was referenced by
the Facebook Oversight Board in its review of Facebook’s suspension of Trump from its
platform). These due process principles require that speech regulations be clear and precise, that
those subject to regulation be provided clear notice of such regulations, that the regulations be
enforced in a manner that is non-discriminatory and transparent, and that enforcement be subject
to an opportunity to challenge—especially where the consequences of such enforcement are
substantial.
This Article concludes with a favorable assessment of the desirability and
constitutionality of certain aspects of proposed legislation that would require platforms like
Facebook and Twitter to comply with certain principles of nondiscrimination and due process as
recognized under the First Amendment, the Due Process Clause, and the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights, and that would prohibit these platforms from engaging in certain
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types of viewpoint discrimination or speaker-based discrimination. This Article contends that,
while the platforms should continue to enjoy the discretion to regulate many categories of speech
that would otherwise be protected by the First Amendment (such as threats, non-obscene
pornography, medical misinformation, etc.) and to moderate content and restrict speakers when
in clear violation of their terms of service, the dominant platforms should not engage in blatant
viewpoint or speaker-based discrimination and should accord their users certain due process type
protections – including the right to receive meaningful advance notice of the platforms’ content
guidelines and terms of service; clear notice when users’ speech is censored or otherwise
regulated or when the speaker herself is deplatformed; information about what particular content
guideline was allegedly violated; and a meaningful opportunity to challenge content moderation
in cases where such moderation severely restricts their exercise of free speech.
Introduction
During the past two and a half decades, the U.S. government essentially adopted a handsoff approach to the Internet—and to the companies that eventually became the dominant social
media platforms, notably Facebook and Twitter.2 Congress ushered into existence this hands-off
approach in 1996 with the passage of Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act3 (“CDA
230”). This law immunized social media platforms from liability for hosting harmful content and
expressly authorized and encouraged platforms to engage in content moderation—such as
content removal, demotion, promotion, and the deplatforming of speakers—free of government
regulation or First Amendment scrutiny.4 Fast forward to the present, when platforms like
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Cameron F. Kerry, Section 230 Reform Deserves Careful and Focus Consideration, BROOKINGS (May,
14, 2021), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/techtank/2021/05/14/section-230-reform-deserves-carefuland-focused-consideration/.
3
Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 133 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 223 (2000)).
4
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Facebook and Twitter have become all-powerful gatekeepers and moderators of content online,
exercising such power only (loosely) subject to their own ever-changing terms of service and
guidelines (which are unenforceable against them in any case). Not surprisingly, this regime has
prompted cries of abuse of power, political bias, censorship—and calls for regulation.5 Of
particular interest and concern in this Article are alleged infringements of free speech and due
process values, including charges of viewpoint discrimination, speaker-based discrimination,
failure to accord due process protections, and exercises of unchecked discretion allegedly
engaged in by the dominant social media platforms. In calling for such regulation, advocates
have compared today’s dominant social media platforms to common carriers like privatelyowned telephone and telegraph companies, to places of public accommodation like large
shopping malls, and to gatekeepers and forums for expression like broadcasters, on which the
government has seen fit at various times over the past century to impose non-discrimination,
must-host, must-carry, fairness, and similar obligations.6
This Article first briefly discusses the history leading up to today’s status quo of nonregulation applicable to the dominant social media platforms, starting with a brief discussion of
the passage, implementation, and overall effects of CDA 230. This Article then fast forwards to
today’s state of affairs, in which various contingents frequently assert claims of discrimination,
bias, exercises of standardless discretion, and unfair treatment by the platforms, and otherwise
point to harms resulting from the unchecked, opaque, inconsistent, and unprecedented power
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See Anthony Izaguirre, Are Social Media Platform [sic] Abusing Their Power? GOP Pushes Bills to
Allow ‘Censorship’ Lawsuits, USA TODAY (Mar. 7, 2021),
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BROOKINGS (Sept. 21, 2018), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/techtank/2018/09/21/regulating-freespeech-on-social-media-is-dangerous-and-futile/.
6
See Matthew Feeney, Are Social Media Companies Common Carriers?, CATO INST. (May 24, 2021),
https://www.cato.org/blog/are-social-media-companies-common-carriers.
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exercised by the dominant social media platforms over our nation’s information ecosystem. This
Article focuses in particular on an examination of the extraordinary control over content and
speakers exercised by Facebook and Twitter during the course of the pandemic and in the
months leading up to the 2020 election, its aftermath, and during and after the insurrection of
January 6, which culminated in both Facebook and Twitter banning then-President Trump from
their platforms and taking actions against other conservative/right-wing speakers. In connection
with allegations of political bias and viewpoint discrimination, this Article examines several
high-profile lawsuits brought against the dominant social media platforms seeking redress as a
result of such alleged bias and unfair treatment—including lawsuits recently brought by former
President Trump against the platforms. This Article examines in detail Facebook’s suspension of
Trump from its platforms and the in-depth scrutiny of this suspension exercised by the Facebook
Oversight Board in Facebook’s review of such suspension. This Article then briefly reviews the
sorts of claims frequently made by everyday social media users, including allegations that the
dominant platforms have moderated their content in ways that are arbitrary, opaque, unchecked,
and that otherwise violate our shared commitments to due process values.
This Article then turns to an analysis of recent federal and state legislative initiatives that
seek to provide remedies for these alleged ills—including the proposed federal DISCOURSE
Act, the 21st Century FREE Speech Act, the PRO-SPEECH Act, and the PACT Act, as well as
state laws like those enacted in Florida and introduced in every state in the country—which seek
to rein in the dominant platforms’ discretion exercised in content moderation decisions, to
prohibit them from engaging in viewpoint discrimination (whether human moderated or
algorithmically implemented), and to impose notice, transparency and other due process-type
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obligations on these platforms (and to correspondingly limit the broad CDA 230 immunity
enjoyed by the platforms for the past twenty-five years).
Next, this Article analyzes the key elements of such proposed legislation in light of the
obligations that the U.S. government historically has imposed on common carriers of content as
well as the regulatory obligations imposed on broadcasters, to ensure that the private entities who
wield enormous power over mediums of communication do so in a manner that comports with
our shared free speech and due process values. In examining these regulatory regimes, this
Article also evaluates the arguments that were asserted by the regulated entities that such
regulations violate their First Amendment rights—arguments that are reiterated by today’s
dominant social media platforms—and that have generally been rejected by the courts. This
Article considers common carrier, fairness, and must carry regulations against the backdrop of
First Amendment precedent and values that disfavor any form of viewpoint or speaker-based
discrimination. This Article then examines the procedural dimensions of our free speech
commitments and values and our shared commitments to due process, including those enshrined
in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (which was referenced by the
Facebook Oversight Board in its review of Facebook’s suspension of Trump from its platform),
and which are embodied in principles of due process generally. These principles require that
speech regulations be clear and precise, that those subject to regulation be provided clear notice
of such regulations, that the regulations be enforced in a manner that is non-discriminatory and
transparent, and that enforcement be subject to an opportunity to challenge—especially where
the consequences of such enforcement are substantial.
This Article concludes with a favorable assessment of the desirability and
constitutionality of certain aspects of proposed legislation such as the DISCOURSE Act, the 21st
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Century FREE Speech Act, and the PACT Act (and similar provisions of state legislation)—
including provisions that would require platforms like Facebook and Twitter to comport with
certain principles of nondiscrimination and due process as recognized under the First
Amendment, the Due Process Clause, and the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, and prohibits these platforms from engaging in certain types of viewpoint discrimination
or speaker-based discrimination. This Article contends that, while the platforms should continue
to enjoy the discretion to regulate many categories of speech that would otherwise be protected
by the First Amendment (such as threats, non-obscene pornography, medical misinformation,
etc.) and to moderate content and restrict speakers when in clear violation of their terms of
service, they should be prohibited from engaging in viewpoint or speaker-based discrimination
and should be required to accord their users certain due process type protections, including the
right to receive meaningful advance notice of the platforms’ content guidelines and terms of
service; clear notice when their speech is censored or otherwise regulated or when the speaker
herself is deplatformed; information about what particular content guideline was allegedly
violated; and a meaningful opportunity to challenge content moderation by the platforms in cases
where such moderation severely restricts their exercise of free speech.

How We Got Here: A Brief Look Back at CDA 230
The genesis of the boundless discretion over content and speakers currently enjoyed by
dominant social media platforms like Facebook and Twitter lies in CDA 230,7 enacted by
Congress in 1996. As has been extensively discussed and debated in past years,8 CDA 230
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Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 133 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 223 (2000)).
See, e.g., Natalie Annette Pagano, Comment, The Indecency of the Communications Decency Act § 230:
Unjust Immunity for Monstrous Social Media Platforms, 39 PACE L. REV. 511 (2018) (discussing the
need to revise CDA 230 immunity to narrow its scope); Ira Steven Nathenson, The Procedural
8
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broadly immunizes online platforms from liability for hosting and facilitating access to harmful
speech.9 But equally important for the purposes of this Article, CDA 230 also specifically
authorizes social media platforms to engage in acts of content moderation—to censor or
otherwise restrict content of their choosing that they deem to be undesirable, including content
that is “lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing or otherwise objectionable,
whether or not such material is constitutionally protected”—and expressly exempts platforms
from most forms of (civil and state criminal) liability for any action the platforms take to censor
or otherwise moderate content.10 Through this latter provision, Congress expressly encouraged
powerful Internet platforms to do what Congress could not itself do—that is, to restrict harmful,
offensive, and otherwise undesirable speech, where such restriction would violate the First
Amendment if it were done by the government.11 In enacting CDA 230, the government excised
itself from the role of protecting (and restricting) free expression on the Internet and passed the
mantle of speech regulation over to private entities, enabling and encouraging them to engage in
content moderation free of the strictures of the First Amendment.
Since CDA 230 became law, in numerous cases, web sites and other platforms have
successfully claimed immunity from a broad range of lawsuits seeking to hold them liable for
making available harmful content posted by others.12 The platforms have also successfully

Foundations of Intellectual Property Information Regulation, 24 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 109, 139
(2020) (discussing CDA 230 immunity as a parallel to Intellectual Property procedural foundations as a
tool for information regulation).
9
See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) ( “No provider ... of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the
publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider.”).
10
See id. §§ 230(c)(2), (e)(3).
11
The Court has held that the government may not restrict speech it finds offensive or hostile to
conventional moral standards as these are forms of viewpoint discrimination. See Matal v. Tam, 137 S.
Ct. 1744, 1751 (2017) (opinion of Alito, J.); see id. at 1762-63; id. at 1765-66 (opinion of Kennedy, J.);
see also Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294, 2300 (2019).
12
See Danielle Keats Citron & Benjamin Wittes, The Internet Will Not Break: Denying Bad Samaritans
Sec. 230 Immunity, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 401, 409 (2017).
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claimed CDA 230 immunity for their acts of content moderation—including content removal,
demotion, promotion (whether human moderated or algorithmically imposed) and for acts of
blocking or deplatforming individual users—regardless of whether such content moderation is
engaged in inconsistently, without notice, or whether such content moderation is viewpoint
discriminatory, and regardless of the effect on speakers’ freedom of expression.13

Recent Allegations of Bias against Conservative Viewpoints
The boundless discretion enjoyed by dominant social media platforms over digital
expression has, not surprisingly, prompted charges of abuse of that discretion. Given the
concentrated ownership of the dominant social media platforms in the hands of three individuals,
it is also not surprising that such unchecked power and control have led to charges of bias against
certain viewpoints and certain speakers, as well as to calls for regulation.14 As Justice Thomas
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See 42 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2); see, e.g., Domen v. Vimeo, Inc., 433 F. Supp. 3d 592, 603-04 (S.D.N.Y.
2020) (finding that Vimeo’s voluntary action to restrict access to materials Vimeo finds objectionable to
qualify for CDA 230 immunity).
14
Such concentrated ownership has also led to calls for antitrust reform as applied to the platforms, see
Martha C. White, Momentum Is Building for Antitrust Reform. Here's What That Means for Big Tech,
Time (Nov. 12, 2021) https://time.com/6116953/antitrust-reform-big-tech-congress-biden/, [citations] and
to other types of regulation. And most recently, the enormous, unchecked control exercised by the
platforms has led to increased attention to the harm that the platforms are causing and/or failing to
prevent. Facebook and Twitter have been criticized recently for not doing enough to remove content from
their platforms that causes real world harm. In October 2021, The Wall Street Journal published the
exposé The Facebook Files on Facebook’s internal regulatory scheme. The Journal obtained this
information from Frances Haugen, a former data scientist at Facebook, who copied thousands of
documents purporting to show that Facebook was aware of the societal harm its platform was causing but
refused to address the problem because of the effect on its bottom line and because of fears of being
called politically biased. Facebook was hesitant to censor inflammatory political content before the
January 6 insurrection at the Capitol, for example, because of the content’s virality, which led to more ad
revenue for the platform. Additionally, the internal documents produced by Haugen showed that 40% of
teen users of Instagram (which is owned by Facebook) could trace their feelings of unattractiveness to the
app, and 6% of US teen users could trace their suicidal thoughts to the app, with such effects being
particularly potent on young girls. See The Facebook Files, THE WALL ST. JOURNAL (Oct., 2021),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-facebook-files-11631713039?mod=article_inline; Bobby Allyn, Here
are 4 key points from the Facebook whistleblower's testimony on Capitol Hill, N.P.R. (Oct. 5, 2021, 9:30
PM), https://www.npr.org/2021/10/05/1043377310/facebook-whistleblower-frances-haugen-congress The
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observed in a recent decision, contemplating and essentially inviting efforts to regulate the
platforms and providing a roadmap for such regulation:
Today’s digital platforms provide avenues for historically unprecedented amounts
of speech….Also unprecedented, however, is the concentrated control of so much
speech in the hands of a few private parties. We will soon have no choice but to
address how our legal doctrines apply to highly concentrated, privately owned
information infrastructure such as digital platforms.15
Allegations of viewpoint-based (and speaker-based) discrimination by the platforms and calls for
regulation reached an apex in the months leading up to and in the immediate aftermath of the
2020 presidential election and the insurrection at the Capitol, when both Twitter and Facebook
deplatformed then-President Trump, disabling his social media access to nearly 90 million
people,16 and taking similar action against certain Trump allies.17 Indeed, for the past several
years, conservatives have alleged that the dominant social media platforms have wielded their
unchecked power in such a way as to censor, deprioritize, discriminate against, and ultimately
deplatform conservative/right-wing viewpoints, speakers and content.18 These actions raised the
questions of whether such content moderation is even-handed and non-discriminatory or whether
it is viewpoint-based or speaker-based, in violation of fundamental shared First Amendment and
free speech values. Below this Article briefly reviews the recent history of allegations of bias by

Haugen revelations have led to increased calls to regulate the dominant social media platforms, which
(like calls for antitrust reform as applied to the platforms) are largely outside the scope of this Article.
15
Biden v. Knight First Amendment Institute at Columbia Univ., 593 U.S. ___ (2021) (mem.)
(Thomas, J., concurring).
16
See Michaela Küfner and Terry Martin, Donald Trump Loses Social Media Megaphone, DW (Jan. 7,
2021), https://www.dw.com/en/donald-trump-loses-social-media-megaphone/a-56158414.
17
See Venkat Ananth, The Great Deplatforming: How Trump Lost His Social Media Platforms, THE
ECONOMIC TIMES (Jan. 23, 2021), https://m.economictimes.com/tech/tech-bytes/the-greatdeplatforming/articleshow/80425125.cms.
18
See John Herrman & Mike Isaac, Conservatives Accuse Facebook of Political Bias, N.Y. TIMES:
TECHNOLOGY (May 9, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/10/technology/conservatives-accusefacebook-of-political-bias.html.
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social media platforms and then turns to an analysis of content moderation in the high-stakes
contexts of the 2020 presidential election, the January 6 insurrection, and their aftermath.
The origins of concerns of bias can be traced at least to 2016, when a report surfaced that
contractors for Facebook were allegedly told to inject stories into the site’s “trending section” to
displace popular conservative stories.19 Allegations and perceptions of viewpoint discrimination
and bias persist today, with 90% of Republicans surveyed by the Pew Research Center in 2020
believing that it is likely that social media sites censor political viewpoints.20 Concerns of bias
against conservative viewpoints were heightened in May 2019, when Facebook took the thenunprecedented step of deplatforming several right-wing/conservative speakers from its platform,
such as Alex Jones and his company/radio show Infowars and Milo Yiannopoulos.21 Facebook
claimed that these figures had violated its policy on “dangerous individuals and organizations,”
although the timing of the ban was seemingly arbitrary.22 In May 2019, Twitter suspended actor
James Woods for alluding to hanging Robert Mueller, the special counsel who investigated the

19

See David Nunez, Former Facebook Workers: We Routinely Suppressed Conservative News, GIZMODO
(May 9, 2016, 10:00 AM), https://gizmodo.com/former-facebook-workers-we-routinely-suppressedconser-1775461006.
20
See Emily A. Vogels, Andrew Perrin & Monica Anderson, Most Americans Think Social Media Sites
Censor Political Viewpoints, PEW RESEARCH CENTER,
https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/2020/08/19/most-americans-think-social-media-sites-censorpolitical-viewpoints/. This is despite the fact that a great deal of conservative content is quite prominent in
social media, with pundits like Dan Bongino creating some of the most shared content on platforms like
Facebook. See Mark Scott, Despite Cries of Censorship, Conservatives Dominate Social Media, POLITICO
(Oct. 26, 2020, 7:55 PM), https://www.politico.com/news/2020/10/26/censorship-conservatives-socialmedia-432643. One reason for such prominence is that conservative content is emotionally engaging, and
when a post is engaging, it is prioritized in the individual’s newsfeed and recommended to other users
more frequently. Supra..
21
See Kari Paul & Jim Waterson, Facebook Bans Alex Jones, Milo Yiannopoulos and Other Far-Right
Figures, THE GUARDIAN (May 2, 2019, 4:38 PM),
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2019/may/02/facebook-ban-alex-jones-milo-yiannopoulos.
22
See id.
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Trump Campaign’s ties to Russian intelligence,23 which prompted a response on Twitter from
then President Trump and an ensuing conservative firestorm.24 These and similar incidents led to
congressional hearings on social media bias and censorship in April 2018,25 followed by similar
hearings in September 2018, April 2019, and July 2019, with congressional leaders grilling
executives from several prominent social media platforms on their content moderation
practices.26
Further allegations of bias against conservative viewpoints arose in the period leading up
to the 2020 presidential election, such as in the context of Twitter’s October 2020 response to a
controversial New York Post article that was highly critical of the son of presidential candidate
Joe Biden.27 After Twitter blocked all links to the controversial article shortly after its release—
citing company policy against allowing hacked materials on the platform28—many conservatives
accused Twitter (and other mainstream media platforms) of interfering in the upcoming election
and suppressing the story to maximize Biden’s chances of winning.29 In response to such

23

See Nathan Francis, Actor James Woods Reportedly Banned From Twitter After Writing 'Hang Them
All' In Response To Mueller Report, INQUISITR (May 3, 2019) https://www.inquisitr.com/5421484/actorjames-woods-reportedly-banned-from-twitter-after-writing-hang-them-all-in-response-to-mueller-report/.
24
See Justin Caruso, James Woods Banned from Twitter Amid Silicon Valley’s Conservative Blacklisting
Campaign, BREITBART (May 3, 2019), https://www.breitbart.com/entertainment/2019/05/03/jameswoods-banned-from-twitter-amid-silicon-valleys-conservative-blacklisting-campaign/.
25
See Bloomberg Quicktake: Now, Diamond and Silk, Others Testify Before Congress, YOUTUBE (Apr.
26, 2018), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yEnMBgSaV-I.
26
See Senator Ted Cruz, Sen. Cruz Questions Mark Zuckerberg on Alleged Political Bias at Facebook April 10, 2018, YOUTUBE (Apr. 10, 2018), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-VJeD3zbZZI&t=73s.
27
See Shannon Bond, Facebook and Twitter Limit Sharing ‘New York Post’ Story About Joe Biden, NPR
(Oct. 14, 2020), https://www.npr.org/2020/10/14/923766097/facebook-and-twitter-limit-sharing-newyork-post-story-about-joe-biden.
28
See Kate Conger & Mike Isaac, In Reversal, Twitter Is No Longer Blocking New York Post Article,
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 16, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/16/technology/twitter-new-yorkpost.html; TWITTER, Distribution of hacked materials policy, https://help.twitter.com/en/rules-andpolicies/hacked-materials (last visited Oct. 24, 2021); @vijaya, TWITTER (Oct. 15, 2020, 10:06 PM),
https://twitter.com/vijaya/status/1316923549236551680.
29
See Mike Issac & Kate Conger, Twitter Changes Course After Republicans Claim ‘Election
Interference’, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 15, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/15/technology/facebooktwitter-republicans-backlash.html.
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pressure, Twitter reevaluated its actions, reversed course, and reinstated the link on its
platform.30
The dominant social media platforms’ content moderation actions taken in response to
the January 6 insurrection at the Capitol led to further allegations of bias against conservative/
right-wing viewpoints.31 The insurrection indeed led to a substantial restriction by social media
platforms of insurrection and election content from the political right.32 Many figures on the
political right had their content removed or were banned by dominant social media platforms,
with some claiming that Facebook was “shadow banning” them—that is, blocking or
deprioritizing content in a manner that was not transparent to the speaker.33 The culmination of
such content moderation practices occurred on January 8, with Twitter permanently banning
then-President Donald Trump from its platform after the January 6 attack at the Capitol

30

34

and

See id.
See Todd Spangler, No Evidence of Anti-Conservative Bias by Social Media, New Study Asserts,
VARIETY (Feb. 1, 2021), https://variety.com/2021/digital/news/anti-conservative-bias-social-media-nyureport-1234897746/.
32
See JARED HOLT, AFTER THE INSURRECTION: HOW DOMESTIC EXTREMISTS ADAPTED AND EVOLVED
AFTER JANUARY 6 US CAPITOL ATTACK 6 (Andy Carvin et al. eds., 2022),
https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/After-the-Insurrection.pdf.
33
For example, in April 2018, pro-Trump online commentators Diamond and Silk received a message
from Facebook stating that the content on their page was “dangerous,” and they believed that Facebook
was shadow banning their content. See Joe Perticone, Facebook VP Apologizes to Pro-Trump Vloggers
Diamond & Silk, Despite Their Misrepresentation of the Dispute, BUSINESS INSIDER (July 17, 2018,
11:12 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/diamond-and-silk-facebook-apology-trump-congresstestimony-2018-7 However, the message was sent in error, as was confirmed later during congressional
testimony. See Facebook: Transparency and Use of Consumer Data: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on
Energy and Com., 117th Cong. 27, (2018) (statement by Mark Zuckerburg).
Nothing on the page was removed or banned whatsoever. This did not stop the duo from appearing in
conservative media to claim that they were being silenced. See Joe Perticone, Facebook VP Apologizes to
Pro-Trump Vloggers Diamond & Silk, Despite Their Misrepresentation of the Dispute, BUSINESS INSIDER
(July 17, 2018, 11:12 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/diamond-and-silk-facebook-apology-trumpcongress-testimony-2018-7. See Chris Ciaccia, Facebook Reconsiders 'Unsafe for Community' Tag on
Pro-Trump Diamond and Silk Videos After Fox & Friends Appearance, FOX NEWS (Apr. 9, 2018),
https://www.foxnews.com/tech/facebook-reconsiders-unsafe-for-community-tag-on-pro-trump-diamondand-silk-videos-after-fox-friends-appearance.
34
See Permanent suspension of @realDonaldTrump, TWITTER BLOG (Jan. 8, 2021),
https://blog.twitter.com/en_us/topics/company/2020/suspension.
31
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Facebook following suit soon after.35 At the time, Trump had eighty-eight million followers on
Twitter36 and routinely used Twitter as a platform to convey, among other things, information
regarding his administration’s policies.37 Although several of Trump’s prior tweets had also
violated Twitter’s terms of service, Twitter had previously applied a special, deferential standard
to the speech of Trump and other “world leaders.”38 Twitter justified its “world leaders”
exception on the grounds that the content of world leaders was often in the “public interest” and
would therefore generally be allowed on the platform in order to allow for “. . . public
conversation and [allow users to] get informed about the world around them.”39 Pursuant to this
policy, tweets from public figures were subject to review by Twitter’s “global enforcement
team,” whose mission was to balance the public harms versus the benefits of keeping such tweets
online.40 If a tweet was deemed to be in the public interest, it would be allowed on the
platform—although the global enforcement team had the option of placing a notice next to the
tweet to provide proper context.41 The team applied a presumption in favor of keeping tweets

35

See Mike Isaac & Kate Conger, Facebook Bars Trump Through End of His Term, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 7,
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/07/technology/facebook-trump-ban.html.
36
See Elizabeth Culliford, David Shepardson & Katie Paul, Twitter Permanently Suspends Trump's
Account, Cites 'Incitement of Violence' Risk, REUTERS (Jan. 8, 2021, 6:32 PM),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-election-trump-twitter/twitter-permanently-suspends-trumpsaccount-cites-incitement-of-violence-risk-idUSKBN29D355.
37
See Trump v. Twitter, No. 3:21-cv-08378 (N.D. Cal. transferred and received Oct. 28, 2021).
38
See Elizabeth Culliford, Twitter Hears From Record Respondents Over World Leader Rules, REUTERS
(May 4, 2021), https://www.reuters.com/technology/twitter-hears-record-respondents-over-world-leaderrules-2021-05-04/.
39
World Leaders on Twitter: principles & approach, TWITTER BLOG (Oct. 15, 2019),
https://blog.twitter.com/en_us/topics/company/2019/worldleaders2019. Facebook has recently been the
target of scathing criticism for its failure to take down hateful speech in other countries and other
languages, including in India and its various languages. For example, Facebook in India has been
repeatedly criticized for granting special exemptions from its hate speech policies for powerful foreign
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under review online.42 However, the process applicable to world leaders’ tweets did not apply
when such a tweet promotes violence, terrorism, doxing,43 or otherwise constitutes an egregious
violation of Twitter’s terms of service.44
Twitter’s global enforcement team was put to the test on January 6, 2021, when it
confronted the unprecedented actions and tweets of a sitting president communicating with his
base in such a manner as to arguably encourage insurrection.45 Specifically, during the beginning
of the insurrectionists’ attack on the Capitol, at 2:24 PM, then-President Trump tweeted:
Mike Pence didn’t have the courage to do what should have been done to protect
our Country and our Constitution, giving States a chance to certify a corrected set
of facts, not the fraudulent or inaccurate ones which they were asked to previously
certify. USA demands the truth!46
During the attack on The Capitol, President Trump tweeted a video message directed at the
rioters at 4:17 PM,47 in which he said, in relevant part:
There has never been a time where such a thing [an election] happened where
they could take it away from all of us . . . This was a fraudulent election . . . Go
home. We love you. You’re very special.48
And at 6:01 PM, Trump tweeted the following:
These are the things and events that happen when a sacred landslide election
victory is so unceremoniously & viciously stripped away from great patriots who
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have been badly & unfairly treated for so long. Go home with love & in peace.
Remember this day forever!49
Twitter concluded that these three tweets violated its civic integrity policies,50 which barred users
from spreading misinformation about the 2020 election,51 and accordingly suspended Trump’s
account for twelve hours following the third tweet. On January 8, after Trump’s account was
temporarily reinstated, Trump tweeted the following at 9:46 AM:
The 75,000,000 great American Patriots who voted for me, AMERICA FIRST,
and MAKE AMERICA GREAT AGAIN, will have a GIANT VOICE long into
the future. They will not be disrespected or treated unfairly in any way, shape or
form!!!52
And Trump tweeted the following at 10:44 AM:
To all of those who have asked, I will not be going to the Inauguration on January
20.53
Twitter construed these last two tweets, in the context in which they were communicated, as
being in violation of its policy banning the glorification of violence,54 under which a tweet
cannot condone “violent acts committed by civilians that resulted in death or serious physical
injury.”55 In its explanation of its decision, Twitter stated that the tweets might not in themselves
have glorified violence, but when considered in the context in which they were communicated,
the tweets reasonably appeared as if Trump was encouraging his supporters to attempt a similar
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type of attack in the near future.56 In an effort to curb any more efforts at real world violence,
Twitter made the decision to ban Trump permanently from its platform.57 Twitter has since made
clear that its ban on Trump is permanent, unconditional, and will continue to be enforced even if
Trump decides to run for re-election.58
Facebook’s response to then-President Trump’s speech in the context of the January 6
insurrection was similar to that of Twitter.59 The same video and similar content contained in the
tweet that Trump posted on Twitter at 4:17 PM and 6:01 PM on January 6 were posted to
Trump’s Facebook page.60 In response, Facebook took immediate action and removed the posts
as a violation of its policy on Dangerous Individuals and Organizations.61 On January 6 at 4:21
pm ET, as the riot at the Capitol was ongoing, Trump posted a video on Facebook and Instagram
in which he stated:
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I know your pain. I know you’re hurt. We had an election that was stolen from us.
It was a landslide election, and everyone knows it, especially the other side, but
you have to go home now. We have to have peace. We have to have law and
order. We have to respect our great people in law and order. We don’t want
anybody hurt. It’s a very tough period of time. There’s never been a time like this
where such a thing happened, where they could take it away from all of us, from
me, from you, from our country. This was a fraudulent election, but we can’t play
into the hands of these people. We have to have peace. So go home. We love you.
You’re very special. You’ve seen what happens. You see the way others are
treated that are so bad and so evil. I know how you feel. But go home and go
home in peace.62
Shortly after that video was posted, at 5:41 pm, Facebook removed this post for violating its
Community Standard on Dangerous Individuals and Organizations.63
Then, at 6:07 pm, as police were securing the Capitol, Trump posted the following
written statement on Facebook:
These are the things and events that happen when a sacred landslide election
victory is so unceremoniously viciously stripped away from great patriots who
have been badly unfairly treated for so long. Go home with love in peace.
Remember this day forever!64
Eight minutes later, at 6:15 pm, Facebook removed this post for violating its Community
Standard on Dangerous Individuals and Organizations and temporarily blocked Trump from
posting on Facebook or Instagram for 24 hours.65 Then, on January 7, after further reviewing
Trump’s posts, as well as his recent communications off Facebook and additional information
about the severity of the violence at the Capitol, Facebook extended its block of Trump
“indefinitely and for at least the next two weeks until the peaceful transition of power is
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complete,”66 with CEO Mark Zuckerberg personally posting a statement about the decision on
his own Facebook page.67
These and similar incidents in which Twitter and Facebook and other social media
platforms took steps to remove conservative speakers and/or their posts from their platforms
have prompted lawsuits challenging actions and to proposed legislation and additional forms of
scrutiny of the platforms’ actions.68 Below this Article examines several prominent lawsuits as
well as proposed legislation that seeks to rein in the power of the dominant social media
platforms to restrict speech and speakers.

Lawsuits Recently Brought by Former President Trump against the Dominant Social
Media Platforms
Former President Trump, aggrieved by the decisions of the dominant social media
platforms to deplatform him and deprive him of his means of engaging via social media with his
more than eighty million followers, has initiated several class action lawsuits to challenge these
actions.69 Trump announced on July 7, 2021, that he was suing Facebook, Twitter, and Google
(as well as their CEOs).70 Trump’s lawsuit against Facebook, for example, generally alleged that
the company engaged in impermissible viewpoint discrimination and content-based
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discrimination, in response to threats by Democrats in Congress that they would bring legislative
action against the company if it failed to deplatform Trump.71 The lawsuit contended that
Democratic legislators in Congress wielded their power and influence to pressure Facebook into
banning Trump and referenced statements from prominent Democrats—such as Vice President
Kamala Harris and Mark Warner (D-Va.)—in which they asserted that social media platforms
should ban Trump.72 The complaint alleged that Democrats use such veiled threats and public
hearings of social media platforms’ CEOs to pressure the platforms into censoring conservative
speech.73 The complaint claimed that Facebook removed Trump and other class members’
accounts74 because of their political viewpoints and without sufficient explanation.75 Trump also
claimed that he and other class members were illegally subject to the company’s “non-existent or
broad, vague, and ever-shifting standards.”76 The complaint alleged that Facebook is a state actor
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for First Amendment purposes77 and that it violated the plaintiffs’ First Amendment right to free
speech because it “impose[d] viewpoint and content-based restrictions on [their] access to
information, views, and content otherwise available to the general public.”78 The complaint
asked the court to find CDA 230 unconstitutional on the grounds that large social media
platforms are state actors who are making content-based restrictions on speech and that such
content-based restrictions violate the First Amendment because they are not narrowly tailored to
serve compelling government interests.79 The complaint further alleged that Facebook works
with Twitter and other social media platforms to coordinate their censorship efforts.80 The
complaint alleged that Facebook developed a tool that allows the platform to censor speech
across a variety of platforms.81 The complaint further pointed to the fact that Facebook Oversight
Board—an independent arbiter that adjudicates certain content-moderation decisions undertaken
by the platform—found that Facebook’s suspension of Trump was not based on a then-existing
Facebook policy.82
In addition, in seeking to hold Zuckerberg personally liable for Facebook’s content
moderation decisions, the complaint further alleged that the company’s actions regarding
Trump’s COVID-related posts violated his free speech rights.83 Trump alleged that Zuckerberg
conspired with the Director of the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Disease, Anthony
Fauci, to suppress speech on the platform and to promote the views of the federal government
while suppressing any speech that conflicted with these viewpoints.84 In particular, Trump
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alleged that Facebook undertook a “concerted, massive, system-wide, and indeed worldwide
program of monitoring COVID-related views and content and censor posts deemed false claims
by Facebook.”85 Trump claimed that the posts that were being censored were not medical
misinformation, but were an opposing political and/or medical viewpoint, such as on the efficacy
of hydroxychloroquine on treating COVID,86 and that censoring such views is unconstitutional
and illegal.87
Trump has also advanced similar allegations against Twitter.88 In Trump’s complaint
against Twitter, he alleged that Twitter sought to censor his and others’ COVID-related tweets at
the behest of Democrat lawmakers.89 Such tweets included those espousing the “lab leak” theory,
which asserts that the virus was either accidentally released from a lab in Wuhan, China or
purposefully released as a biological weapon.90 Notable Chinese scientists who supported the
theory earlier in the pandemic were banned from Twitter for espousing such views, including LiMeng Yan, a former researcher at the Hong Kong School of Public Health,91 and Harry Chen,
who reported about the virus directly from Wuhan during the beginning of the pandemic. Both
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were banned by Twitter for violating its policies on misinformation.92 Trump’s complaint against
Twitter further raises due process type concerns, alleging that Twitter users were not provided
meaningful notice of the platform’s evolving terms of service.93 In particular, Trump complains
that Twitter’s terms of service “span seventy-six (76) pages [and] sixty-five (65) hyperlinks to
topics incorporated into the User Agreement,”94 are subject to unilateral change by the platform,
and that users are bound by the agreement and any and all modifications, regardless of whether
they receive notice of any such changes.95
Finally, Trump’s allegations set forth in his complaint against Google/YouTube were
similar to those alleged against Facebook and Twitter.96 In particular, Trump reiterated
allegations of censorship and viewpoint discrimination that the platform allegedly exercised over
his and other plaintiffs’ COVID-related content.97 In short, the former president’s complaints
against Facebook, Twitter, and Google/YouTube included allegations of unconstitutional
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viewpoint discrimination, content discrimination, and complaints about due process-type
violations, including lack of clear standards/guidelines, arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement
of such guidelines, and inadequate notice of the applicable, evolving terms of service.98
The vast majority of users on social media do not enjoy the status, wealth, or power of
Donald Trump, of course, and do not have the means to bring lawsuits or other challenges to the
content moderation actions or deplatforming taken against them by dominant social media
platforms. Many everyday citizens have nonetheless informally alleged that the platforms have
moderated their content in ways that are arbitrary, opaque, unchecked, and that otherwise violate
our shared commitments to due process (and freedom of expression). As this Article discusses
below,99 such shared principles of due process prescribe that individuals be provided with clear
advance notice of precise content guidelines, explanations when their content is subject to
content moderation pursuant to such guidelines, consistent unbiased application of such
guidelines, and an opportunity to challenge or appeal such acts of content moderation—
particularly when those actions have severe consequences for social media users, like suspending
or blocking them from the platform.
While the dominant social media platforms have made some progress in providing notice
to their users of their (expansive and ever-changing)100 community guidelines or terms of
service, they have generally been less transparent regarding their actions taken pursuant to such
terms (unless the user subject to such actions happens to be the President of the United States).
Although claims of such due process-type violations by everyday users frequently are, by their
very nature, difficult to document, some reports have surfaced of such actions by the dominant
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social media platforms.101 In general, ordinary social media users tend to claim that, while they
may have notice of the platforms’ terms of service, they are not meaningfully informed of which
terms of service they have violated in any particular instance, nor of when they are blocked, nor
are they given meaningful opportunities to appeal.
A glimpse into the scale and scope of such content moderation actions is possible by
examining the transparency reports that are made available on a voluntary basis by the platforms.
All of the dominant social media platforms produce a type of transparency report that provides
an overview of their content moderation practices and actions.102 Because there is no
standardization of such reporting, and because these reports do not provide granular details, it is
difficult to assess whether the platforms are consistently applying their terms of service/
community guidelines, and whether they are doing so in a manner that provides affected social
media users with notice of and an opportunity to challenge adverse decisions. What is clear,
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however, is that allegations of opaque, inconsistent content moderation actions without advance
notice or opportunity to respond on the part of affected users appear to be widespread, despite
the platforms’ progress on transparency reporting, as discussed below.
According to Twitter, from July 1, 2020 through December 31, 2020 (the most recent
reporting period), the company had removed 3.8 million tweets for violating their Terms of
Service and company rules.103 Twitter saw an increase by nine percent from the last reporting
period in accounts suspended, and an increase of 132 percent for content removal.104 Twelve
million accounts were reported as violating Twitter’s Terms of Service, which accounted for a
two percent increase from the previous reporting period.105 Facebook also provides a
transparency report of its community standards enforcement.106 Facebook uses a similar metric
whereby it reports the amount of content and accounts actioned upon.107 Taking action can
include content removal, account disabling, or placing a warning over the content.108 Facebook’s
transparency report details the amount of content, and fake accounts, it takes action against and
the category of community standard it violated.109 The report also records the number of appeals
from content removal Facebook receives for each category and the number of restorations (both
with and without appeal) to content removed.110 If a user is adversely affected by a content

103

See Rules Enforcement, TWITTER (July 14, 2021), https://transparency.twitter.com/en/reports/rulesenforcement.html#2020-jul-dec.
104
See id. This totaled to about 1 million accounts removed and 4.5 million instances of content removal.
See id.
105
See id.
106
See Community Standards Enforcement, FACEBOOK (Nov. 2021),
https://transparency.fb.com/data/community-standards-enforcement/.
107
See id.
108
See Content Actioned, FACEBOOK (July 29, 2021),
https://transparency.fb.com/policies/improving/content-actioned-metric/. However, the report does not
currently record accounts disabled for violating Facebook rules, accounts disabled only refers to fake
accounts. See id.
109
See Community Standards Enforcement, supra note 106.
110
See id. The report also provides the same information for content removed from Instagram. See id.

26

decision by Facebook, the user can appeal to the Oversight Board.111 First, users must request
Facebook to reconsider its content decision, and if the user does not agree with that decision, he
or she may appeal.112 The Board will select from those appeals, prioritizing those that meet
criteria set out in the Board’s bylaws,113 and a subset of the Board will review and issue a draft
decision.114 The full Board then is empowered to review the draft decision, and a written
statement explaining their decision will be published—which may include policy
recommendations to Facebook.115 However, only a small subset of appeals is taken up by the
Facebook Oversight Board, and most users must simply abide by the actions undertaken by the
company itself.116
Social media users’ allegations of viewpoint discrimination, lack of transparency, and
other free speech and due process-type violations by the dominant social media platforms have
not escaped judicial notice—at least, not the notice of Justice Clarence Thomas.117 In his
concurring opinion vacating and dismissing as moot a case involving viewpoint discrimination
by then-President Trump with respect to Trump’s Twitter account (which became doubly moot
after Trump was no longer president and was permanently kicked off Twitter), Justice Thomas
took the occasion to opine about viewpoint discrimination and other alleged free speech and due

111

See Appealing Content Decisions on Facebook or Instagram, OVERSIGHT BOARD,
https://oversightboard.com/appeals-process/.
112
See id.
113
See id.
114
See id.
115
See id.
116
See id.; see also Oversight Board Publishes Transparency Report for Third Quarter, OVERSIGHT
BOARD (December 2021), https://www.oversightboard.com/news/640697330273796-oversight-boardpublishes-transparency-report-for-third-quarter-of-2021/.
117
See Biden v. Knight First Amend. Inst. at Columbia Univ., 141 S. Ct. 1220, 1221 (2021) (Thomas, J.,
concurring).

27

process-type violations by the dominant social media platforms like Twitter and Facebook. 118 In
his opinion, Justice Thomas signaled that he would be sympathetic toward attempts to regulate
dominant social media platforms and suggested that common carriage would be a useful
legislative framework for such regulation.119 Speculating on the desirability of such regulation
and the possibility of subjecting such regulations to something less than heightened judicial
scrutiny, Justice Thomas recently opined:
If part of the problem [with dominant social media platforms] is private,
concentrated control over online content and platforms available to the public,
then part of the solution may be found in doctrines that limit the right of a private
company to exclude [viz., the common carriage doctrine and the public
accommodations doctrine]….
The long history in this country and in England of restricting the exclusion right
of common carriers and places of public accommodation may save similar
regulations today from triggering heightened scrutiny…. There is a fair argument
that some digital platforms are sufficiently akin to common carriers or places of
accommodation to be regulated in [the same] manner.
In many ways, digital platforms that hold themselves out to the public resemble
traditional common carriers. Though digital instead of physical, they are at
bottom communications networks, and they “carry” information from one user to
another. A traditional telephone company laid physical wires to create a network
connecting people. Digital platforms lay information infrastructure that can be
controlled in much the same way. And unlike newspapers, digital platforms hold
themselves out as organizations that focus on distributing the speech of the
broader public….
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If the analogy between common carriers and digital platforms is correct, then an
answer may arise for dissatisfied platform users who would appreciate not being
blocked: laws that restrict the platform’s right to exclude.
Even if digital platforms are not close enough to common carriers, legislatures
might still be able to treat digital platforms like places of public accommodation
….
The similarities between some digital platforms and common carriers or places of
public accommodation may give legislators strong arguments for similarly
regulating digital platforms. It stands to reason that if Congress may demand that
telephone companies operate as common carriers, it can ask the same of digital
platforms.120
Justice Thomas’s suggestion of common carriage (or an analogous framework) as a foundation
for regulation to prohibit viewpoint discrimination, unsubstantiated blocking of users, and
similar acts of content moderation by the dominant social media platforms did not fall on deaf
ears, and legislators at both the federal and state levels have since taken up the mantle of
regulating the platforms with something akin to Justice Thomas’s suggested roadmap in mind.121

Legislative Attempts to Limit Discretion of Dominant Social Media Platforms
In recent months, a host of federal and state legislative measures have been introduced
(and some enacted) to address alleged issues of bias, discrimination, opaque decision-making,
standardless discretion, and similar alleged violations by dominant social media platforms.122
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Such legislation—including the proposed DISCOURSE Act, the 21st Century FREE Speech Act,
and the PACT Act—generally seek to treat dominant social media platforms as akin to common
carriers who are subject to nondiscrimination obligations, to treat such platforms as akin to state
actors for purposes of the First Amendment (which would prohibit them from discriminating on
the basis of viewpoint or speaker identity), to require them to accord due process-type
protections to their users, and to limit or circumvent the immunity enjoyed by platforms under
CDA 230.123

Federal Legislation
First, Senator Marco Rubio (R-FL) has introduced the Disincentivizing Internet Service
Censorship of Online Users and Restrictions on Speech and Expression Act (the DISCOURSE
Act).124 This Act is designed (1) to advance certain free speech/First Amendment values by
prohibiting the platforms from engaging in (human moderated or algorithmic) viewpoint
discrimination and (2) to advance certain due process values by imposing transparency and
disclosure requirements on the platforms.125 The Act would also amend CDA 230 to specify that
the CDA’s limitation of liability does not apply unless the platforms comply with the Act’s
terms.126
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First, the DISCOURSE Act seeks to advance free speech values by limiting viewpoint
discrimination, by subjecting dominant social media platforms to liability if they moderate
content in a way that advantages certain viewpoints, including if they implement algorithms that
do so.127 In particular, the Act would remove CDA 230’s broad limitation of liability from a
platform with a “dominant market share” if the platform:
(i) engages in a content moderation activity that reasonably appears to express,
promote, or suppress a discernible viewpoint for a reason that is not protected
from liability under subsection (c)(2), including reducing or eliminating the
ability of an information content provider to earn revenue, with respect to any
information . . . ; or
(ii) engages in a pattern or practice of content moderation activity that reasonably
appears to express, promote, or suppress a discernible viewpoint for a reason that
is not protected from liability under subsection (c)(2), including reducing or
eliminating the ability of an information content provider to earn revenue . . . .128
The Act would also remove CDA 230’s limitation of liability if the platform engaged in
viewpoint discrimination by means of automated processes, if it:
amplifies information provided by [a user] by using an algorithm or other
automated computer process to target the information directly to users without the
request of a sending or receiving user . . . ; or
engages in a pattern or practice of amplifying information provided by [a user] by
using an algorithm or other automated computer process to target the information
directly to users without the request of a sending or receiving user . . . .129
Second, the DISCOURSE Act seeks to advance free speech values by limiting discrimination
against certain types of content, by limiting the categories of content the platforms can restrict
while still enjoying CDA 230’s limitation of liability.130 Specifically, the Act would achieve this
goal by amending CDA 230(c)(2). This section currently provides that no platform “shall be held
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liable on account of any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict access to or availability
of material that the provider or user considers to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively
violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable, whether or not such material is constitutionally
protected.”131 The Act would condition this limitation of liability on an objective reasonableness
standard and limit the permissible bases for which a platform can in good faith restrict access to
content.132 Specifically, under the DISCOURSE Act, in order to continue to enjoy CDA 230’s
limitation on liability, a platform would only be permitted to restrict access to content if it has
“an objectively reasonable belief” that the content is “obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy,
excessively violent, harassing, promot[es] terrorism,” is determined to be “unlawful,” or
promotes “self-harm.”133
The DISCOURSE Act also seeks to advance certain due process values by requiring
platforms to issue certain disclosures to their users.134 In particular, the Act would require
platforms to issue public disclosures related to content moderation, promotion, and curation, with
the goal of enabling consumers to make informed choices regarding such services.135 The
DISCOURSE Act requires that these disclosures be made either through a “publicly available,
easily accessible website” or by submitting the information to a commission which will then
make it available to the public through the commission’s website.136 These disclosures are
intended to “inform and protect consumers” by enabling them to hold platforms accountable and
by “level[ing] the playing field” with the removal of “unfair protections . . . .”137
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The 21st Century FREE Speech Act, introduced by Senator Bill Hagerty (R-TN) in late
April 2021, characterizes dominant social media platforms as common carriers and imposes
nondiscrimination, transparency, and due process requirements on—and limits the immunity
enjoyed by—such platforms.138 This Act requires “common carrier technology companies”—
interactive computer services that offer services to the public and have more than 100 million
worldwide monthly active users, excluding broadband providers—to provide their services
without unreasonably discriminating against individuals or groups based on political or religious
affiliation, to publish their content management guidelines, to explain their content restriction
decisions, and to give content creators facing adverse restriction decisions a meaningful
opportunity to respond to such decisions.139 The Act further abrogates CDA 230 immunity under
circumstances where common carrier companies fail to comply with the Act’s requirements.140
Specifically, the 21st Century FREE Speech Act prohibits dominant platforms from
making or giving “any undue or unreasonable preference or advantage to any particular person,
class or persons, political or religious groups or affiliation, or locality,” and requires that
“common carrier” tech companies “disclose . . . accurate material regarding [their] content
management, moderation, promotion, account termination and suspension, and curation
mechanisms.”141 In cases where these companies either discriminated in violation of the Act’s
provisions or failed to publish clear guidelines regarding their moderation practices, they would
be liable for suit by affected private individuals and by states’ attorneys general.142
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The 21st Century FREE Speech Act also substantially limits the immunity currently
afforded to interactive computer service providers by classifying certain “common carrier”
providers as publishers when they comment or editorialize on, promote, recommend, increase or
decrease visibility of material, restrict access to material, or bar information content providers
(users) from their services, whether this is done manually or by an algorithm.143 The Act also
defines, using regulatory and language from applicable Supreme Court precedent, those classes
of material listed in CDA 230’s “Good Samaritan” blocking and screening of offensive material
section.144
In addition, the Platform Accountability and Consumer Transparency (PACT) Act,
introduced by Senators Thune and Schatz (originally in 2020 and again in 2021), provides a
limited reduction in content moderation liability for social media companies.145 The Act would
enforce transparency and some other due process type requirements, but would not create any
liability for viewpoint or speaker-based discrimination.146 While the Act’s findings include
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concerns about the impact social media companies have on the speech interests of their users, 147
the Act would explicitly leave unchanged CDA immunity provision.148 Liability, which would be
defined pursuant to the Federal Trade Commission “unfair or deceptive acts or practices”
rulemaking, would attach only where companies (1) failed to timely review user-generated
complaints alleging that certain content violates the law or company policies, (2) failed to notify
content creators about the reasons for removal of content or failed to follow an appeals process,
or (3) failed to publish a bi-annual report detailing removal practices.149
Further proposed legislation, Representative Steube’s (R-FL)
Saving Expression in Technology (CASE-IT) Act,

Curbing Abuse and

would regulate viewpoint discrimination

by the platforms by classifying interactive service providers as information content providers and
removing their CDA 230 immunity any time their content moderation “reasonably appears to
express, promote, or suppress a discernible viewpoint for a reason that is not protected from
liability” under the Good Samaritan clause.150
The “Promoting Rights and Online Speech Protections to Ensure Every Consumer is
Heard Act” (PRO-SPEECH Act) from Senator Wicker (R-MS) would prohibit large Internet
platforms from blocking access to “lawful content, application, service, or device that does not
interfere with the internet platform’s functionality or pose a data privacy or data security risk to a
user.”151 The PRO-SPEECH Act also would prohibit all Internet platforms from discriminating
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based on “racial, sexual, religious, political affiliation, or ethnic grounds,”152 and would charge
the Federal Trade Commission with regulating “unfair methods of competition,” particularly
large internet platforms blocking other platforms from using large platforms’ services or
committing “unreasonable discrimination” against competitors.153 In order to enforce these rules,
the PRO-SPEECH Act would allow platform users to submit complaints of violations to the
Federal Trade Commission and require the platforms to respond.154 The Act would also mandate
new disclosures from large Internet platforms regarding, among other things, content curation
and modification, access to cloud computing services, platform self-proclamation as
“publisher[s],” and data privacy.155
Finally, some proposed legislation would almost completely abrogate CDA 230
immunity. Senators Graham (R-SC), Hawley (R-MO), and Blackburn (R-TN) have introduced a
bill to entirely repeal CDA 230 and to strike its references from other parts of the U.S. Code.156
In the House, the Protecting Constitutional Rights From Online Platform Censorship Act
introduced by Rep. DesJarlais (R-TN) would strike the Good Samaritan provision from CDA
230 and would make it illegal for interactive service providers to “take an action to restrict
access to or the availability of ‘protected material’ of a user of such platform.”157 At present, the
Act does not specify whether algorithmic content moderation would fit the definition of “tak[ing]
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an action.”158 “Protected material” is defined as “material that is protected under the Constitution
or otherwise protected under Federal, State, or local law.”159 The proposed Act would create a
private right of action for users whose protected content was restricted, with allowable relief
ranging from $10,000 to $50,000.160
State Legislation
In addition to the federal legislation proposed above, legislation to regulate social media
platforms has been introduced in all 50 states.161 Many of these bills are titled the “Stop Social
Media Censorship Act (SSMCA)” and are based on a model bill.162 Florida and Texas have taken
the lead in enacting such legislation (and in having such legislation struck down), as discussed
below.
Florida’s Senate Bill 7072, titled The Stop Social Media Censorship Act, was signed into
law by Florida governor Ron DeSantis on May 24, 2021.163 The Act characterizes dominant
social media platforms as constituting the “new public town square,”164 and provides that they
should accordingly be regulated as common carriers. The Florida law would impose various
transparency and other due process-type requirements on the platforms and prohibit them from
censoring journalists or candidates for office.165 Specifically, the legislation would require major
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social media platforms:166 (1) to make public all the criteria they use to make decisions regarding
deplatforming and shadow banning;167 (2) to provide users, upon request, with data on how many
people saw their post;168 (3) to provide users with notice when they or their content are
deplatformed or shadow banned (whether via human or algorithmic moderation) and such notice
must include a "thorough" rationale explaining why the content was censored and an explanation
of how the content was flagged or how the platform otherwise became aware of such content;169
(4) to make all of the algorithms they use to sort content on users’ newsfeeds public; (5) to allow
the user the ability to opt out of such algorithms;170 and (6) to provide annual notices to remind
users of the company’s deplatforming policies.171 In addition, the law would prohibit a social
media platform from (7) barring from its site any candidate for public office or using postprioritization algorithms on users who qualify as candidates for public office or elected public
officials;172 and (8) censoring or deplatforming or otherwise acting on the content of a "journalist
enterprises"173 (except if the content the platforms seek to censor is considered obscene).174 The
Act provides that both the state of Florida and private individuals have legal recourse against
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platforms if they violate the terms of the law, with remedies of up to $100,000 per violation,
along with punitive damages and equitable relief, available.175
Immediately after the bill’s passage, the law was successfully challenged by NetChoice
and the Computer and Communications Industry Association,176 two powerful industry trade
groups that count Twitter, Facebook, and Google as among their members.177 The federal judge
hearing the case enjoined the Florida law because he found that the challengers were likely to
succeed on the merits of their First Amendment claim and that the law failed to meet either strict
or intermediate scrutiny necessary to survive under the First Amendment.178 The judge held that
“[b]alancing the exchange of ideas among private speakers is not a legitimate governmental
interest.”179 The Court also held that NetChoice had demonstrated its likelihood of success on the
merits of proving certain provisions of the statute invalid as preempted by CDA 230.180 Because
social media platforms are immune from liability under CDA 230 if they moderate content on
their platforms in good faith, the fact that Florida’s statute would impose liability in similar
situations makes it inconsistent with CDA 230 and thus preempted by federal law.181
Texas enacted similar legislation, motivated by similar concerns as those that motivated
the Florida legislation. HB 20 is very similar to Florida’s law, with the Texas legislature finding
that “social media platforms are akin to common carriers.”182 This Texas law makes it a crime
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for social media platforms with 100 million users in a calendar month to “censor” expression
based on viewpoint or geographic area.183 “Censor” is defined as “to block, ban, remove,
deplatform, demonetize, de-boost, restrict, deny equal access or visibility to or otherwise
discriminate against expression.”184 As with the recently enacted Texas abortion law185 (and the
Florida legislation discussed above),186 the bill also creates a private right of action for citizens.
If the social media platform does not stop censoring after the claim is successfully made, the
social media platform can be found in contempt of court and ordered to pay “daily penalties
sufficient to secure immediate compliance.”187 The bill provides that the Attorney General may
bring an action for declaratory relief and injunction.188
In a case challenging Texas House Bill 20, a Texas federal judge enjoined the law from
taking effect.189 In this case, the judge rejected the characterization of social media platforms as
common carriers, and instead likened them to newspapers engaging in editorial discretion—even
when performing this discretionary content moderation by algorithm.190 The Court then
addressed the Texas law’s requirement that social media providers disseminate objectionable
content—objectionable to the social media provider—and the law’s limitation on social media
providers’ editorial discretion.191 The judge held that these requirements violate the First
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Amendment,192 because the compelled disclosures were “inordinately burdensome.”193 Between
the compelled speech,194 the unduly burdensome nature of the statute’s requirements,195 the
chilling effect that the threat of lawsuits under the statute created,196 and the fact that the statute
imposes content-based, viewpoint-based, and speaker-based restrictions,197 the statute was
subject to strict scrutiny under the First Amendment.198 The court further held that the statute
failed to survive strict scrutiny because the government interests at stake are not compelling and
the statute is not narrowly tailored.199 Thus, the court found that the challengers were likely to
succeed on the merits, and enjoined the Texas law.200

The Constitutionality of Regulations Restricting the Substantive Dimensions of
Dominant Social Media Platforms’ Content Moderation
Several provisions of the proposed (and enacted) legislation discussed above seek to
impose restrictions on the substantive dimensions of the dominant social media platforms’
content moderation decisions, such as obligations that prevent the platforms from engaging in
viewpoint discrimination or prohibit them from censoring or deplatforming candidates for public
office or journalistic enterprises.201 These obligations bear some resemblance to the
nondiscrimination obligations that the U.S. has historically imposed on “common carriers”—and
such provisions indeed seek to characterize social media platforms as common carriers in laying
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the foundation for such regulation.202 As Justice Thomas explained in his opinion in the Knight
Foundation case discussed above,203 common carriage doctrine has historically imposed
obligations on privately-owned speech conduits to facilitate the expression of others and to
“ensure open, nondiscriminatory access to the means of communication.”204 Notwithstanding the
private ownership of such entities, the common carriage doctrine prohibits these entities from
exercising the discretion to determine which communication to facilitate and which to censor,
thereby foreclosing arguments that such conduits enjoy predominant First Amendment rights of
their own to exercise editorial discretion.205 Telephone companies, for example, have long been
legally obligated to connect all (legal) telephone calls and to otherwise facilitate
communications.206 From the early years of the United States, the government has imposed
obligations on private entities engaged in transportation, communications, and other important
public service functions to facilitate the free flow of commerce and information free of
censorship or discrimination.207 Through the common carriage doctrine, the government has
bridged the gap between public and private entities and imposed duties on entities that provide
important communication functions for the benefit of the public.208 As such:
[T]he law of common carriage protects ordinary citizens in their right to
communicate. [This doctrine] rests on the . . . assumption that, in the absence of
regulation, the carrier will have enough monopoly power to deny citizens the right
to communicate. The rules against discrimination are designed to ensure access to
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the means of communication . . . . [T]his element of civil liberty is central to the
law of [common carriage].209
Individuals who rely on common carriers to facilitate their communications “benefit from the
democratic egalitarianism that characterizes the nondiscriminatory access principle associated
with common carrier law.”210 As such, the common carriage model is “the paradigm of
mandatory access to a communications medium.”211
From the beginning of the modern communications era in the 1930s, the Federal
Communications Commission (F.C.C.) imposed obligations on privately owned providers of
interstate communications services like telephone and telegraph companies to facilitate the
transmission of all legal content.212 Congress overhauled the regulation of telecommunications
providers in the Communications Act of 1934, which charged the newly-created F.C.C. with
regulatory authority over the communications providers of the day (telegraph and telephone
companies), regardless of whether they enjoyed monopoly power, and imposed additional
common carriage regulations on such providers.213 Under the 1934 Act, common carriers were
charged with the obligation to serve as conduits for all (legal) content originated by others.214
Unlike newspaper publishers, for example, common carriers are not entitled to engage in
editorial discretion to determine which content to transmit and which to censor.215 As such,
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common carriers are distinct from publishers or other editors who enjoy their own First
Amendment rights to exercise editorial discretion in their selection and exclusion of content.216
Throughout the mid-twentieth century, common carriage/nondiscrimination obligations were
applied to traditional conduits of communication like telephone companies.217 Under
telecommunications law, common carriers are prohibited from making “any unjust or
unreasonable discrimination in charges, practices, classifications, regulations, facilities, or
services . . . or to make or give any undue or unreasonable preference or advantage to any
particular person [or] class of persons . . . or to subject any particular person [or] class of persons
. . . to any undue or unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage.”218 Accordingly, under the
paradigm common carriage model, conduits for communication like telecommunications
providers do not themselves enjoy independent First Amendment rights; rather, they are required
to facilitate the free speech interests of others, without discrimination.219
In a number of decisions in the 1980s, courts made clear that the common carriage
doctrine allows carriers some discretion to refuse to carry certain categories of content.220 For
example, in Carlin Communications v. Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph,221 a provider of
sexually-themed messages sought to require the regional telephone company to carry its
messages on its 976 network, through which users could pay a special fee in order to access such
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content.222 Although the district court held that the telephone company, as a common carrier, was
required to carry all legal content without discrimination,223 the Ninth Circuit reversed,224
holding that the telephone company enjoyed the right to exercise its “business judgment about
what messages, even lawful ones, it will carry.”225 In a similar case involving the same content
provider, in Carlin Communication v. Southern Bell Telephone and Telegraph, the Eleventh
Circuit also held that the regional telephone company could exercise its “business judgment” to
refuse to carry Carlin’s sexually-themed messages via its dial-it medium.226 These decisions
suggest that regulating a communications medium as a common carrier does not mean that the
entity is prohibited from excluding certain categories of content (like adult content) in the
exercise of their business judgment.
In sum, the common carriage doctrine, which has long been imposed on privately-owned
conduits for communication, requires that these conduits carry the communication of others
without discrimination. Although the doctrine has historically prohibited common carriers from
exercising their own editorial discretion, in certain instances common carriers have been
permitted to decline to carry certain categories of content (like adult content) where such carriage
would be inconsistent with their “business interests.”227
The U.S. government has also imposed obligations on other types of powerful conduits
for expression in order to facilitate free speech interests and First Amendment values, as I
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discuss below. In the early years of the broadcast mediums, the F.C.C. took the position that
“one of the most vital questions of mass communication in a democracy is the development of an
informed public opinion through the public dissemination of news and ideas concerning the vital
public issues of the day.”228 In order to achieve these goals, the F.C.C. adopted a series of
regulations that together came to be known as the “fairness doctrine,” which required
broadcasters to serve as fiduciaries for the public interest and which granted a conditional right
of access to certain members of the public on certain matters of public importance.229 The
fairness doctrine was designed to ensure that broadcasters’ coverage of controversial issues of
public importance was balanced and fair.230 Broadcasters, which were conceptualized under the
fairness doctrine as public trustees, were required to afford a reasonable opportunity for
discussion of competing points of view and controversial issues of public importance, and were
prohibited from using their licenses purely to serve their private interest.231 The fairness doctrine
further required that broadcasters actively seek out issues of importance to their local community
and to air programming that focused on these issues.232 The F.C.C. in 1971 established rules
requiring broadcasters to report on their efforts to provide programming on issues of concern to
their community.233
In its central case upholding the fairness doctrine, Red Lion Broadcasting v. F.C.C.,234
the Supreme Court ruled on a challenge to the constitutionality of the fairness doctrine.235 The
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challenged aspects of the fairness doctrine required broadcast stations to provide notification and
a right of access—an opportunity to respond—when “during the presentation of views on a
controversial issue of public importance, an attack is made upon the honesty, character, integrity,
or like personal qualities of an identified person or group.”236
Broadcasters challenged the fairness doctrine, contending that the regulations abridged
their First Amendment right to free speech and free press.237 In rejecting this challenge—and,
importantly for purposes of this analysis—in prioritizing the free speech interests of members of
the public over the free speech interest of the broadcasters, the Supreme Court explained that
“differences in the characteristics of new media justify differences in the First Amendment
standards applied to them.”238 Because a limited number of broadcast frequencies exist, the
Court held, the state is justified in treating the chosen licensees as proxies or fiduciaries for
members of the public at large.239 In balancing the First Amendment right of the broadcasters to
select what speech to facilitate against the rights of the viewers and listeners to be informed on a
broad range of public issues, the Court held that the rights of members of the public—the
viewers and listeners—were paramount.240 The Court placed primacy on the role of free
expression in facilitating democratic self-government and expressed hostility toward restrictions
of free speech by public or private speech conduits:
It is the purpose of the First Amendment to preserve an uninhibited marketplace
of ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail, rather than to countenance
monopolization of that market, whether it be by the Government itself or a private
licensee. Speech concerning public affairs is more than self-expression; it is the
essence of self-government. It is the right of the public to receive suitable access
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to social, political, esthetic, moral, and other ideas and experiences which is
crucial here.241
With respect to this particular marketplace of ideas, the Court expressed serious doubt about
whether an unregulated market would facilitate speech conducive to discussion and debate on
matters of public importance, and viewed with skepticism a speech market dominated by the
“private interests.”242 The Court emphasized the First Amendment goal of “producing an
informed public capable of conducting its own affairs”243 and was skeptical about whether this
goal could be achieved in a market dominated by private interests:
Freedom of the press . . . does not sanction repression of that freedom by private
interests. . . . The right of free speech of a broadcaster . . . does not embrace a
right to snuff out the free speech of others. . . .244
The Red Lion Court gave little credence to the claims of the broadcasters that they themselves
enjoyed the First Amendment right to use their frequencies to broadcast the content of their
choosing and to deny access to whomever they chose.245 The Court had no difficulty
subordinating the First Amendment rights of the broadcasters to the First Amendment rights of
prospective speakers and members of the public, and chose to limit broadcasters’ free speech
rights in order to advance the preeminent First Amendment goal of “producing an informed
public capable of conducting its own affairs.”246
This trend of U.S. regulators imposing obligations on communications conduits to
advance free speech interests of members of the public was extended through “must carry”
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obligations imposed by the F.C.C. on cable systems operators, which were also upheld by the
Supreme Court against constitutional attack by the operators.247 As in its decision upholding the
constitutionality of the fairness doctrine, the Court in its decision upholding the constitutionality
of must carry obligations balanced the free speech interests of the cable operators against the free
speech interests of members of the public, and held that the free speech interests of members of
the public were paramount.248 The 1994 case of Turner Broadcasting System v. F.C.C.
involved a challenge brought by cable systems operators to the “must carry” provisions of the
Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992 (the Cable Act).249 This Act
required cable systems operators to carry the signals of certain local broadcast television stations,
without charge, on a continuous, uninterrupted basis and in the same numerical channel position
as when these programs were broadcast over the air.250 In passing the Cable Act, Congress
expressed concern about the concentration of economic power in the cable industry and about
how this concentration of power endangered the ability of local broadcast stations to compete for
viewing audiences.251 Congress found that local broadcast television was “an important source of
[content] . . . critical to an informed electorate”252 and that regulation was necessary to ensure
that the electorate continue to receive content essential to produce well-informed citizens on
matters of public concern.
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The cable systems operators—like social media platforms of today—argued that these
regulations unconstitutionally infringed their free speech rights to make decisions about which
content to carry. While ultimately upholding key provisions of the statute, the Court took the
occasion to refine and clarify its basis for upholding government intervention in the broadcast
market in Red Lion.253 While declining to hold that the economic sources of market dysfunction
at issue in Turner justified the same reduced scrutiny that the Court applied to the regulations in
Red Lion, the Court did find that certain features of the cable television market justified state
intervention into this market (and less-than-strict scrutiny of such state intervention).254 The
Court also held that in balancing the First Amendment rights of the cable operators against those
of members of the public, the First Amendment rights of members of the public were
paramount.255 The Court rejected the analogy that the cable operators sought to draw between
their First Amendment rights and those of newspaper publishers.256 In opposing the statute, cable
operators had cited the Court’s holding in Miami Herald v. Tornillo,257 in which the Court struck
down a right of reply requirement imposed upon newspapers and held that this requirement
unconstitutionally intruded upon the editorial prerogative of the newspapers. Cable operators
claimed that they enjoyed free speech rights and editorial rights that were analogous to those
enjoyed by newspaper publishers, and that the same strict scrutiny the Court applied to the
regulations in Tornillo were applicable to them.258 The Court disagreed and held that although
both newspapers and cable operators may enjoy economic monopoly status in a given
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geographical locale, the cable operator enjoys much greater control over access to its medium
and much greater power to affect the free speech rights of members of the public:
The potential for abuse of this private power over a central avenue of
communication cannot be overlooked. Each medium of expression … must be
assessed for First Amendment purposes by standards suited to it, for each may
present its own problems. The First Amendment’s command that government not
impede the freedom of speech does not disable the government from taking steps
to ensure that private interests not restrict, through physical control of a critical
pathway of communication, the free flow of information and ideas.259
The Court expressed concern about cable operators’ gatekeeper control over the content
they made available to members of the public and viewed such control over a “central avenue of
communication” as a sufficient basis for justifying government intervention into this medium of
expression.260 Because of the control that cable operators exercised over this “critical pathway of
communication” and the consequences of such control for the “free flow of information and
ideas,” the Court concluded that intermediate, not strict, scrutiny was the proper level of scrutiny
to apply to the regulations in this case.261 Such scrutiny required the Court to consider whether
the speech regulations at issue served an important government interest and that the restriction of
First Amendment freedoms of the cable systems operators was no greater than necessary to
achieve that interest.262
In applying this intermediate scrutiny, the Court identified several important government
interests that were advanced by the Act, including promoting the widespread dissemination of
information from a multiplicity of sources and promoting fair competition in the market for
communications at issue.263 In particular, the Court recognized the government purpose “of the
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highest order” in ensuring public access to a multiplicity of information sources.264 On this point,
the Court explained that “it has long been a basic tenet of national communications policy that
the widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources is
essential to the welfare of the public.”265 The Court specifically explained that the First
Amendment “does not disable the government from taking steps to ensure that private interests
not restrict, through physical control of a critical pathway of communication, the free flow of
information and ideas.”266 The majority approved of the state’s intervention into this market for
speech to protect the free flow of information and ideas and to secure broad public exposure to a
multiplicity of information sources—values that were central to the First Amendment.267
Reviewing the case after remand, the Court, per Justice Kennedy, credited evidence that the
potential harms Congress had sought to remedy were real, that the must-carry regulations served
the government’s important interests directly and effectively, and that the regulations did not
burden substantially more of the cable operators’ speech than necessary to further these
interests.268
In his concurring opinion, Justice Breyer addressed the contention that the must carry
regulations impermissibly restricted the free speech rights of the cable operators. Breyer
acknowledged that the must carry regulation “extracts a serious First Amendment price—
amounting to the suppression of speech . . . by . . . interfer[ing] with the protected interests of the
cable operators to choose their own programming.”269 Yet, he explained, there were other,
weightier First Amendment interests on the other side of the balance, the side of the public—
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namely, the statute’s purpose of advancing the national communications policy of protecting “the
widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources”:
[This national communications] policy, in turn, seeks to facilitate the public
discussion and informed deliberation, which, as Justice Brandeis pointed out
many years ago, democratic government presupposes and the First Amendment
seeks to achieve… Indeed, Turner [below] rested in part upon the proposition that
assuring that the public has access to a multiplicity of information sources is a
governmental purpose of the highest order, for it promotes values central to the
First Amendment.270
Breyer concluded that although there were important First Amendment interests “on both sides
of the equation,” the regulation struck a reasonable balance between potentially speechrestricting consequences for cable operators and speech-enhancing consequences for members of
the public.271 In short, in upholding the constitutionality of the must carry regulations, the Court
approved of regulation of speech intermediaries where the intermediaries exercised significant
control over the content accessible by members of the public.272 In so doing, the Court
recognized the importance of facilitating public discussion and informed deliberation, which
“democratic government presupposes and the First Amendment seek to achieve.”273

Treatment of Viewpoint-Based and Speaker-Based Discrimination in First Amendment
Jurisprudence
The nondiscrimination, fairness, and must carry obligations that were constitutionally
imposed on private communications conduits under the common carriage and fairness doctrines
and the must carry regulations provide some support for proposed regulations of today’s
dominant social media platforms. In addition, as this section argues, the hostility that the
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Supreme Court has expressed toward viewpoint discrimination and speaker-based distinctions in
speech regulations provides support for provisions of platform regulation that aim to prohibit
viewpoint-based and speaker-based discrimination by the platforms.
Under the Supreme Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence, viewpoint discrimination in
speech regulations is regarded as “the most pernicious of First Amendment sins”274 and the most
egregious type of discrimination275—even more egregious than regulations that embody contentbased distinctions.276 In addition, regulations that embody speaker-based discrimination are also
viewed by the Court with substantial skepticism.277 As the Court explained in Cornelius v.
NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc.,278 regulations violate the First Amendment
when they “den[y] access to a speaker solely to suppress the point of view he espouses on an
otherwise includible subject.”279 While content-based distinctions are generally suspect and
presumptively unconstitutional, regulations that restrict particular viewpoints are even more
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blatantly and presumptively unconstitutional.280 As the Court held in Rosenberger v. Rector and
Visitors of Univ. of Va., when a regulation “targets not subject matter, but particular views taken
by speakers on a subject,” the regulation embodies “an egregious form of content discrimination”
and is (even more so) presumptively unconstitutional.281 In short, for the past half-century, the
Court has regarded viewpoint discrimination as constituting one of the most serious and
egregious affronts to First Amendment values.282
Regulations that embody speaker-based distinctions are also constitutionally suspect
under the Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence.283 Although the Court has recognized that
some categories of speakers—such as students, government officials or public employees—are
accorded reduced First Amendment protections,284 in general, speaker-based distinctions require
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careful scrutiny because “[s]peech restrictions based on the identity of the speaker are all too
often simply a means to control content,”285 and even when they are not, they are still carefully
scrutinized by the Court. In Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC,286 for example, the Court
held that “speaker-based laws demand strict scrutiny when they reflect the Government’s
preference for the substance of what the favored speakers have to say (or aversion to what the
disfavored speakers have to say).”287 Further, in Citizens United,288 the Court held that “speakerbased regulation of speech—or discrimination based on the identity of the speaker—violates the
First Amendment,” regardless of whether the regulation was content-neutral or content-based.289
More recently, the Court in its decisions in Sorrell v. IMS Health290 and Reed v. Gilbert291
reiterated that heightened scrutiny is required when a regulation imposes speaker-based and
content-based restrictions. In particular, the Court has expressed skepticism of speaker-based
restrictions because such restrictions risk enabling only speech that is consistent with the State’s
preferred views.292
In short, the Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence makes clear that regulations that
discriminate based on viewpoint are presumptively unconstitutional, and regulations that embody
speaker-based distinctions are subject to heightened scrutiny, in part because they risk being
viewpoint-based and/or content-based.293 Accordingly, legislative efforts to restrict the dominant
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social media platforms from engaging in viewpoint-based discrimination or speaker-based
distinctions may be construed by courts as advancing the compelling government interests of
protecting core free speech and First Amendment values.

The Constitutionality of Regulations Restricting the Procedural Dimensions of Dominant
Social Media Platforms’ Content Moderation
In addition to substantive components of speech regulations that regulators have
sought to impose on dominant social media platforms (such as those restricting viewpoint or
speaker-based discrimination), several provisions of proposed legislation impose procedural and
due process-type requirements on the platforms.294 As discussed above, such legislative
provisions require the platforms to provide notice to their users when their content is removed
(including notice regarding the community guideline or term of service that the user allegedly
violated); to provide users with an opportunity to appeal adverse moderation decisions; and to
issue public disclosures and guidelines related to their content moderation decisions, removal
actions, etc.295 Such provisions should be construed by courts as content-neutral—not contentbased—restrictions on the speech of the platforms, and therefore should be subject to less than
strict scrutiny, under which these provisions should be upheld if they advance an important or
substantial government interest in a narrowly tailored manner that does not substantially burden
more speech than necessary. These regulations advancing due process-type interests should be
held to satisfy the applicable intermediate scrutiny, as this Article discusses below.
Regulations requiring the disclosure of transparency reports and changes to social media
platforms’ Terms of Service should be viewed as content-neutral regulations advancing
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important government interests in protecting due process, fairness, the free flow of information
on social media platforms, and the informational interests of social media consumers. To
determine whether a regulation is content-based, courts must “consider whether a regulation of
speech ‘on its face’ draws distinctions based on the message the speaker conveys.”296 The Court
has also determined that “if a law applies to particular speech because of the topic discussed or
the idea or message expressed,” then it is also content-based.297 However, neither of these
situations arises in the context of requiring due process and procedural mechanisms within social
media platforms’ content regulation schemes. These requirements apply irrespective of the
message the social media platform seeks to convey.298 If the proposed legislation’s requirements
do not depend on a consideration of the topic, idea, or message expressed by a speaker, they
should not be considered content-based.299 Instead, courts should find these requirements to be
content-neutral because “[t]he principal inquiry in determining content-neutrality in speech cases
generally . . . is whether the government has adopted a regulation of speech because of
disagreement with the message it conveys.”300
Content-neutral regulations of speech must be narrowly tailored and serve a substantial or
important government interest.301 These proposed regulations of social media platforms appear to
meet the requirements of intermediate scrutiny because the government’s important interest here
is to protect free speech on the platforms.302 Courts should also approve the disclosure
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requirements imposed by the proposed legislation. The Supreme Court has approved similar
disclosure requirements in election contexts.303 The Court upheld the disclosure requirements of
the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act because while they “may burden the ability to speak,” they
do not “prevent anyone from speaking.”304 In the proposed legislation under consideration, the
important governmental interest is in advancing the due process rights of consumers of social
media platforms.305 For example, the disclosure of changes to a social media platform’s terms of
service is substantially related to ensuring that consumers are aware of the terms they are
violating when their content is moderated by the social media platform.
In addition, to the extent that disclosure requirements compel speech, such regulations
merely require factual and uncontroversial information about platforms’ terms of service, similar
to the disclosures considered and upheld in the foundational case of Zauderer v. Office of
Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court of Ohio.306 In contrast, in National Institute of Family &
Life Advocates v. Becerra,307 the Court held that the disclosure requirement mandated by the
state was unconstitutional because it altered the content of the crisis pregnancy center’s
speech.308 The Court found in NIFLA that Zauderer did not apply because the disclosure
requirement in NIFLA went beyond “purely factual and uncontroversial information about the
terms under which … services will be available.”309
303
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In requiring disclosures of social media platforms, the proposed regulations are limited to
purely factual and uncontroversial information.310 Requiring a social media platform to disclose
its own terms of service to its consumers should not be considered as requiring the disclosure of
“controversial” information. Further, such disclosure requirements are not unduly burdensome
because some social media platforms voluntarily produce transparency reports that contain this
information.311 Thus, courts should hold that the disclosure requirements are not unduly
burdensome under relevant First Amendment jurisprudence.312
Furthermore, these regulations advance the important government interests of advancing
users’ due process rights.313 Shared commitments to due process principles, under the U.S.
Constitution and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), require that
speech restrictions be imposed—whether by government entities or by powerful private speech
regulators—in a manner that is clear, transparent, non-arbitrary, and that provides adequate
notice to the affected users. 314 These commitments also require that rules restricting speech be
implemented in a manner that is narrowly tailored to achieve the important interests supporting
any such speech restrictions.315 Major social media platforms should be required to adopt and
implement procedural guidelines that protect the due process rights that are essential to
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democratic societies. Protecting due process rights is the first step in protecting and respecting
human rights, which transnational corporations—as well as countries—have a duty to protect
under the ICCPR.316 As United Nations’ Special Representative of the Secretary-General John
Ruggie emphasized in his “Protect, Respect and Remedy” framework, business enterprises as
well as nations have a duty to respect human rights.317 An essential part of respecting human
rights is respecting the due process rights of affected individuals.318 Dominant social media
platforms should be required to respect due process principles that are grounded in the free
speech and due process jurisprudence of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
and the United States Constitution.
A foundational component of widely shared due process principles is that, in democratic
societies, individuals have a right to conduct their lives so as to conform their conduct and their
expression to the dictates of governing laws and rules and so as to avoid violations of such laws
and regulations.319 This in turn requires that laws and regulations clearly and precisely indicate
what expression is prohibited, so that individuals can steer clear of such expression.320 Because
of the paramount importance of freedom of expression to democratic societies, it is especially
important that laws and rules restricting speech do so in a narrow and precise manner, to avoid
creating a chilling effect on expression. Under U.S. First Amendment jurisprudence, laws
restricting expression must be articulated in a manner that is clear, precise, and specific.321 The
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U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly held that laws restricting speech that are vague or overbroad
are invalid.322 The Supreme Court has also rejected as unconstitutional any system of censorship
that reposits unbounded discretion in the decision-maker to determine whether or not speech is
protected.323 First, without reference to the substantive categories of which speech can
constitutionally be deemed illegal, the U.S. Supreme Court has rejected—both on First
Amendment and on Due Process grounds—laws that are framed in vague and imprecise terms
because such laws fail to provide clear notice of what speech is prohibited and allow for
government officials to exercise standardless discretion.324 Regulations on speech must be
crafted “with sufficient definiteness [so that] ordinary people can understand what is
prohibited”325 and “in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement.”326 The “requirement of clarity in regulation is essential to the protections provided
by the Due Process Clause.”327 A law is unconstitutionally vague if persons “of common
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.”328
Laws that do not clearly and precisely define the proscribed content are constitutionally
infirm because they are fundamentally unfair.329 Such laws “trap the innocent by not providing
fair warning” of what expression is prohibited and because they impermissibly delegate “basic
policy matters to policemen, judges and juries for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis,
with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory application.”330 In particular, the U.S.
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Supreme Court has explained that vague laws have a chilling effect on expression, as such laws
tend to lead citizens to “steer far wider of the unlawful zone than if the boundaries of the
forbidden [were] clearly marked.”331 On these grounds, the Supreme Court has, for example,
rejected a law that, in part, prohibited “treat[ing] contemptuously the flag of the United States,”
because it failed “to draw reasonably clear lines between the kinds of . . . treatment that are
criminal and those that are not.”332 Although laws regulating non-expressive conduct may also be
struck down on vagueness grounds, vague laws regulating expression are particularly carefully
scrutinized because of the danger of chilling constitutionally protected speech.333 As the Court
explained, “[b]ecause First Amendment freedoms need breathing space to survive, the
government may regulate in the area only with narrow specificity.”334
The U.S. Supreme Court has also consistently rejected laws that are overbroad—laws that
sweep too broadly so as to encompass both unprotected speech and protected speech.335 For
example, a law that criminally prohibited the use of “opprobrious words or abusive language,
tending to cause a breach of the peace” was held to be unconstitutionally overbroad, even though
it could constitutionally be applied to prohibit certain types of particularly harmful expression,
because it could also be unconstitutionally applied to protected expression.336 In addition, the
Supreme Court has invalidated systems for licensing speech that vest unbridled discretion in the
initial decision-maker.337
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Although dominant social media platforms should continue to enjoy discretion to
determine what categories of speech are prohibited on their platforms, they should be required to
formulate rules articulating which categories of speech are prohibited in as narrow and precise a
manner as language permits. As I discuss below, the

International Covenant and the U.S. First

Amendment each provide support for this foundational due process principle.
The International Covenant requires that any rules restricting freedom of expression meet
three requirements: (1) the rules must be clear and accessible (the principle of legality); (2) the
rules must be designed for a legitimate aim (the principle of legitimacy) and (3) the rules must be
necessary and proportionate to the risk of harm (the principle of proportionality).338
Regarding the first requirement for speech restrictions under the ICCPR, the Facebook
Oversight Board, for example, in conducting an extensive analysis of whether Facebook’s
decision to suspend then-President Trump from its platform, conducted a detailed analysis of
whether the decision was in compliance with Facebook’s commitment to human rights under the
ICCPR, under the principle of legality, which requires that the speech regulation at issue be clear
and accessible.339 The Board found that Facebook’s decision to suspend Trump was in
compliance with Facebook’s articulated policies, specifically, its Dangerous Individuals and
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Organizations policy. Under its Dangerous Individuals and Organizations policy, 340 Facebook
examines, among other things, the “ties to violence” of the entity that posts such content, and,
applying this policy, Facebook apparently classified Trump’s insurrection posts as a Tier 1
violation, because the posts took place as the attack on the Capitol was ongoing and because
Trump referred to the insurrectionists as “patriots” while indicating his support for their
actions.341
In assessing Facebook’s actions in compliance with the first Article 19 criterion—clarity
and accessibility—the Board had noted the vagueness of Facebook’s Dangerous Individuals and
Organizations policy in previous cases, but the Board found that despite such vagueness,
Trump’s violation fell squarely within the clear letter of the policy, given that Trump praised a
group that was responsible for the death of five people.342 It concluded that potential vagueness
in other applications of the policy did not void the policy in its entirety.343 The Board concluded
that Facebook’s Dangerous Individuals and Organizations policy was “clear and accessible,” at
least as applied in this case.344
Second, both U.S. and international law per the ICCPR require that speech restrictions be
appropriately tailored to advance the interest at stake and that they do so in the least speech-
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restrictive means possible.345 Under the ICCPR, restrictions on speech must be necessary and
proportionate to the risk of harm.346
In summary, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the United
States First Amendment each provides strong support for the due process requirement that social
media platforms be required to articulate narrow, specific descriptions of what speech is subject
to regulation, so as to confine the discretion of the decision-maker and so as to provide fair
notice to individuals of what speech is prohibited.

Conclusion
Several aspects of proposed federal and state legislation aimed at regulating dominant
social media platforms to restrain abuses of power—specifically to restrict viewpoint
discrimination, speaker-based discrimination, and to protect shared due process values—should
be upheld by the courts against constitutional challenge.
First, because of the enormous role that dominant social media platforms serve in
facilitating expression in today’s information ecosystem, courts should prioritize the free speech
interests of members of the public over the free speech interests of the platforms. While the
platforms may be said to enjoy limited free speech rights of their own—as do broadcasters and
cable network operators (and, to a lesser extent, common carriers)—the platforms’ free speech
interests are outweighed by the free speech interests of the members of the public in having their
speech facilitated and moderated free of viewpoint- and speaker-based discrimination and in a
manner that is consistent with shared notions of due process. Just as the Supreme Court weighed
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the free speech interests of members of the public over those of common carriers like telephone
services, broadcasters, and cable network operators, so too should the courts scrutinizing the
constitutionality of proposed platform regulations prioritize the free speech interests of social
media users over those of the social media platforms. This is not to say that the platforms should
be treated as state actors for First Amendment purposes and prohibited from regulating any types
of speech. Rather, the platforms should be prohibited from engaging in core acts of censorship,
such as discriminating on the basis of viewpoint or speaker identity. Viewpoint and speakerbased discrimination skews the public discussion and deliberation necessary for democratic selfgovernment and protecting against such discrimination forms the core of our system of free
expression.
Second, courts should recognize the due process interests of members of the public with
respect to their speech on social media and should uphold regulations that require such platforms
to respect and protect the rights of speakers not to have their expression restricted or blocked
without adequate notice of applicable and clearly-defined content guidelines and without an
explanation of the reasons why their speech was actioned and a meaningful opportunity to
challenge such action. And, courts should recognize that these due process considerations take
on heightened importance in circumstances where a speaker is suspended or banned from a
platform outright. These due process considerations for speakers on social media platforms are
supported by widely shared commitments to due process protections, such as the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which applies to actions by private entities, as well as by
core First Amendment due process protections.
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